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Terrorist attacks on transportation networks have traumatized modern societies. With a single
blast, it has become possible to paralyze airline traffic, electric power supply, ground transportation
or Internet communication. How and at which cost can one restructure the network such that it
will become more robust against a malicious attack? We introduce a unique measure for robustness
and use it to devise a method to mitigate economically and efficiently this risk. We demonstrate its
efficiency on the European electricity system and on the Internet as well as on complex networks
models. We show that with small changes in the network structure (low cost) the robustness
of diverse networks can be improved dramatically while their functionality remains unchanged.
Our results are useful not only for improving significantly with low cost the robustness of existing
infrastructures but also for designing economically robust network systems.
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The vulnerability of modern infrastructures stems
from their network structure having very high degree
of interconnectedness which makes the system resilient
against random attacks but extremely vulnerable to tar-
geted raids [1–17]. We developed an efficient mitigation
method and discovered that with relatively minor modi-
fications in the topology of a given network and without
increasing the overall length of connections, it is possi-
ble to mitigate considerably the danger of malicious at-
tacks. Our efficient mitigation method against malicious
attacks is based on developing and introducing a unique
measure for robustness. We show that the common mea-
sure for robustness of networks in terms of the critical
fraction of attacks at which the system completely col-
lapses, the percolation threshold, may not be useful in
many realistic cases. This measure, for example, ignores
situations in which the network suffers a significant dam-
age, but still keeps its integrity. Besides the percolation
threshold, there are other robustness measures based, for
example, on the shortest path [18–20] or on the graph
spectrum [21]. They are, however, less frequently used
for being too complex or less intuitive. In contrast, our
unique robustness measure, which considers the size of
the largest component during all possible malicious at-
tacks, is as simple as possible and only as complex as
necessary. Due to the ample range of our definition of
robustness, we can assure that our process of reconstruct-
ing networks maintains the infrastructure as operative as
possible, even before collapsing.
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I. MODEL
A. Modeling attack on infrastructures
We begin by demonstrating the efficiency of our unique
approach to improve the performance of two of the most
fragile, but critical infrastructures, namely, the power
supply system in Europe [22] as well as the global Inter-
net at the level of service providers, the so-called Point
of Presence (PoP) [23]. The breakdown of any of these
networks would constitute a major disaster due to the
strong dependency of modern society on electrical power
and Internet. In Figs. 1a and 1b we show the backbone
of the European power grid and the location of the Eu-
ropean PoP and their respective vulnerability in Figs. 1c
and 1d. The dotted lines in Figs. 1c and 1d represent the
size of the largest connected component of the networks
after a fraction q of the most connected nodes have been
removed. Instead of using the static approach to find the
q most connected nodes at the beginning of the attack,
we use a dynamical approach. In this case the degrees
are recalculated during the attack, which corresponds to
a more harmful strategy [24]. As a consequence, in their
current structure, the shutdown of only 10% of the power
stations and a cut of 12% of PoP would affect 90% of
the network integrity. In order to avoid such a dramatic
breakdown and reduce the fragility of these networks,
here we propose a strategy to exchange only a small num-
ber of power lines or cables without increasing the total
length of the links and the number of links of each node.
These small local changes not only mitigate the efficiency
of malicious attacks, but at the same time preserve the
functionality of the system. In Figs. 1c and 1d the robust-
ness of the original networks are given by the areas under
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
17
41
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  9
 M
ar 
20
11
2FIG. 1. Mitigation of malicious attacks on the power supply system in Europe and the global Internet at the level of service
providers. In (a) we show the EU power grid with N = 1254 generators and M = 1811 power lines [22] and in (b) the Internet
with N = 1098 service providers and M = 6089 connection among them, where only the European part is shown [29]. The
red edges correspond to the 5% connections that we suggest to replace by the green ones. A detailed description of the chosen
edges is given in the SI. The network fragmentation under a malicious attack is shown for (c) EU power generators and for (d)
PoP. The dashed lines in (c) and (d) corresponds to the size of the largest component in each original system and the solid lines
to typical redesigned networks after changing 5% of the connections. The green areas give the mitigation of malicious attack,
which correspond to improving robustness by 45% for the EU power grid and 55% for the PoP.
the dashed curves, while the areas under the solid lines
correspond to the robustness of the improved networks.
Therefore, the green areas in Figs. 1c and 1d demon-
strate the significant improvement of the resilience of the
network for any fraction q of attack. This means that
terrorists would cause less damage or they would have
to attack more power stations, and hackers would have
to attack more PoP in order to significantly damage the
system.
B. Introducing the unique robustness measure
Next, we describe in detail our methodology. Usually
robustness is measured by the value of qc, the critical
fraction of attacks at which the network completely col-
lapses [24]. This measure ignores situations in which the
network suffers a big damage without completely collaps-
ing. We thus propose here a unique measure which con-
siders the size of the largest component during all possible
3FIG. 2. Demonstration that small changes have a large impact on the robustness while the functionality of the networks
remains. a) Improvement of robustness R as a function of the fraction of changed links for both networks, where R0 is the
original robustness. In the case of the EU power grid, we find that changing only two connections increases the robustness
by 15%. When changing 2% of the links, the robustness of the EU power grid improves by 35% and the Internet by 25%.
b) The cumulative conductance distribution F (G) versus the conductance G for both networks before and after the changes.
Conductances between two nodes are measured for all pairs of nodes, assuming that each link in the network has unitary
conductance. Both curves are nearly identical, which means that the transport properties, i.e., the functionalities of the
improved networks are very close to the original ones.
malicious attacks. Malicious raids often consist of a cer-
tain fraction q of hits and we want to assure that our
process of reconstructing networks will keep the infras-
tructure as operative as possible, even before collapsing.
Our unique robustness measure R, is thus defined as,
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
s(Q) , (1)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and s(Q)
is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected cluster
after removing Q = qN nodes. The normalization factor
1/N ensures that the robustness of networks with dif-
ferent sizes can be compared. The range of possible R
values is between 1/N and 0.5, where these limits cor-
respond, respectively, to a star network and a fully con-
nected graph.
C. Constraints for improving networks
For a given network, the robustness could be enhanced
in many ways. Adding links without any restrictions un-
til the network is fully connected would be an obvious
one. However, for practical purposes, this option can be
useless since, for example, the installation of power lines
between each pair of power plants would skyrocket costs
and transmission losses. By associating costs to each link
of the network, we must seek for a reconstruction solu-
tion that minimizes the total cost of the changes. We also
assume that changing the degree of a node can be particu-
larly more expensive than changing edges. These two as-
sumptions suggest keeping invariant the number of links
and the degree of each node. Under these constraints,
we propose the following algorithm to mitigate malicious
attacks. In the original network we swap the connections
of two randomly chosen edges, that is, the edges eij and
ekl, which connect node i with node j, and node k with
node l, respectively, become eik and ejl [26], only if the
robustness of the network is increased, i.e., Rnew > Rold.
Note that a change of the network usually leads to an
adjustment in the attack sequence. We then repeat this
procedure with another randomly chosen pair of edges
until no further substantial improvement is achieved for
a given large number of consecutive swapping trials. In
Fig. 1 of the SI we show numerical tests indicating that
the algorithm can indeed yield close to optimal robust-
ness. As described so far, our algorithm can be used to
improve a network against malicious attacks while con-
serving the number of links per node. Nevertheless, for
real networks with economical constraints, this conserva-
tion of degree is not enough since the cost, like the total
length of links, can not be exceedingly large and also
the number of changes should remain small. Therefore,
for reconstructing the EU power grid and the worldwide
PoP, we use an additional condition that the swap of two
links is only accepted if the total length (geographically
calculated) of edges does not increase and the robustness
is increased by more than a certain value.
4FIG. 3. Validation that one can design robust networks regardless of the degree distribution and the system size. The relative
robustness improvement R/R0 − 1 vs network size N for (a) scale-free networks with degree exponent γ = 2.5 and 3 and (b)
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with 〈k〉 = 3.5 and 4. Starting from a given network, we swap two randomly chosen connections, that
is, eij , which connects node i with node j, and ekl become eik and ejl, only if the robustness of the network is increased. This
procedure is repeated until during the last 10000 attempts no further improvement could be achieved. Note that the swapping
keeps the degree of each node unchanged. Results are averaged over at least five independent initial networks. We do not show
error bars, since they are smaller than the symbol sizes.
II. RESULTS
A. Improving existing infrastructures
Figure 2a shows that, despite these strong constraints,
the robustness R can be increased by 55% for PoP and
45% for the EU grid with only 5.5% of link changes and
by 34% and 27%, respectively, with only 2%. Interest-
ingly, although the robustness is clearly improved, we
observe that the percolation threshold qc remains prac-
tically the same for both networks, justifying our unique
definition for the measure R as a robustness criterion.
More strikingly, the conductance distribution [25], which
is a useful measure for the functionality of the network,
also does not change (see Fig. 2b). This suggests that
our optimized network is not only more robust against
malicious attacks, but also does not increase the total
length of connections without any loss of functionality.
B. Designing robust networks
The success of this method in reconstructing real net-
works to improve robustness at low cost and small effort
leads us to the following question: Can we apply our
algorithm to design new highly robust networks against
malicious attacks? In this case, since we build the net-
work from the beginning, the number of changes should
not represent any limitation, since we are dealing with
only a computational problem. For designing, the only
constraint which remains is the invariance of the degree
distribution. Here we study both artificial scale-free [27]
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks [28]. In Fig. 3 we show how
the robustness depends on the system size for designed
scale-free networks with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ ,
with γ = 2.5 and 3, and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with aver-
age degree 〈k〉 = 3.5 and 4. One can see that our method
is also very efficient in designing robust networks.
While the most robust network structure for a given
degree distribution is virtually impossible to determine,
our study reveals that all networks investigated can
be improved significantly (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 2 in SI).
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4a, the robust networks we
obtain clearly share a common and unique “onion-like”
structure consisting of a core of highly connected nodes
hierarchically surrounded by rings of nodes with de-
creasing degree. To quantitatively test our observation,
we calculate the maximal number of nodes Sk with
degree k which are connected through nodes with a
degree smaller or equal to k. As shown in Fig. 4b, paths
between nodes of equal degree, which are not passing
through nodes with higher degree, emerge in the robust
networks. Although at a first glance onion-like networks
might look similar to high assortative networks, the
later ones are different and can be significantly more
fragile (see Fig. 3 in SI). We also find that onion-like
networks are also robust against other kinds of targeted
attacks such on high betweenness nodes [24] (see Fig. 4
in SI). The last topological properties we study are the
average shortest path length between two nodes, l, and
the diameter, d, corresponding to the maximal distance
between any pair of nodes [7]. Counter intuitively, l and
d do not decrease after the optimization, but slightly
increase. Nevertheless, it seems that both values grow
not faster than logarithmically with the system size N .
5FIG. 4. Visualization of the novel onion-like topology of robust networks. a) The onion-like topology of a robust scale-free
network with N = 100 nodes, M = 300 edges and a degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−2.5. The sizes of the nodes are proportional
to their degree, and nodes with similar degree have the same color. Edges between nodes with equal degree and the fully
connected core are highlighted. In onion-like networks nearly each pair of nodes with equal degree k is connected by a path
that does not contain nodes of higher degree. b) Fraction of nodes with degree k that are connected through nodes with a
degree smaller or equal to k for scale-free networks with γ = 2.5 and N = 4000.
(see Fig. 5 in SI)
III. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have introduced a unique measure for
robustness of networks and used this measure to develop
a method that significantly improves, with low cost, their
robustness against malicious attacks. Our approach has
been found to be successfully useful as demonstrated on
two real network systems, the European power grid of
stations and the Internet. Our results show that with
a reasonably economical effort, significant gains can be
achieved for their robustness while conserving the nodes
degrees and the total length of power lines or cables.
In the case of designing scale-free networks, a unique
“onion-like” topology characterizing robust networks is
revealed. This insight enables to design robust net-
works with a prescribed degree distribution. The appli-
cations of our results are imminent on one hand to guide
the improvement of existing networks but also serve on
the other hand to design future infrastructures with im-
proved robustness.
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Supporting Information Appendix
A. Detailed description of our algorithm for Fig.
1: Our algorithm starts with calculating the robustness
of the original PoP (power supply system). Therefore,
the robustness R of 2000(1000) independent attacks
based on the adaptive calculation of the highest degree
nodes are calculated. The average robustness value is
assigned to the initial robustness Rold.
To improve the network’s robustness, two nodes i and j,
and two of their neighbors k and l, are chosen randomly.
If the swap of the neighbors, l becomes neighbor of i and
k becomes neighbor of j, neither creates self-connections
nor double-connections, the geographical lengths of the
edges eil and ejk is determined. Only if the sum of
these lengths is shorter than the sum of the lengths of
eik and ejl, the robustness of the new network Rnew
is calculated, again averaged over 2000(1000) indepen-
dent attacks. The swap of the neighbors is accepted,
only if it would increase the robustness significantly
Rnew > Rold + δR, whereas the threshold δR is arbitrary
set to δR = 0.0006(0.001). Note that the threshold
should be so large that nearly every change is rejected.
After testing 106(108) independent swaps, the threshold
is reduced by a arbitrary factor of 0.8.
Then 106(108) more swaps are performed with the new
threshold, before the threshold is decreased again by a
factor of 0.8. This loop is repeated 10 times and finally,
after 107(109) tested swaps, the improved networks,
shown in Fig. 1, are obtained.
Note that the including of the decreasing threshold
ensures that changes with the largest impact, are
performed first.
B. Optimal test: In order to test if our algorithm
identifies an optimal or near-to-optimal solution, we
applied our procedure to three different types of arti-
ficial networks, having all the same number of links,
but different degree distributions. The first type is the
scale-free network [27], the second is the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
[28] network and the third a random regular network
having a fixed degree. While the most robust network
against malicious attacks for a given degree distribution
is unknown, the most robust network for a given number
of edges is a network in which all nodes have the same
degree. Therefore, to test our model we will only
impose in our algorithm the constraint of conserving
the total number of links, but allowing changes of the
degree distribution. In this way, the original swapping
mechanism of two connections in the algorithm is
replaced by the exchange of a given edge by another one
which connects two randomly, but not connected nodes.
We find that the robustness of the final networks are
practically indistinguishable, as shown in Supporting
Figure 1a. Not only their robustness is similar, but
also the obtained degree distributions of the networks
converge to a delta function around 〈k〉 (see Supporting
Figure 1b). These results represent strong indication
7that our algorithm efficiently finds the structure very
close to the most robust network. Simulations with
different initial realizations of distinct networks types
also converged to similar final states in both robustness
and degree distribution.
C. Model networks: In Supporting Figs. 2a and 2c
we show the robustness of scale-free and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
network models. The robustness of the model networks
are given by the areas under the dashed curves, while the
areas under the solid lines correspond to the robustness
of the improved networks. Therefore, the green areas
indicate the improvement of the resilience of the network
for any fraction q of attack. As shown in Supporting
Figs. 2b and 2d, the overall behavior of the conductance
distribution F (G), which is a useful measure for the
transport functionality of the network, also does not
change.
D. Assortative networks: In Supporting Fig. 3 we
show the result of our method when applied to a high
assortative network (r = 0.65) that does not display
onion-like structure. Although these two networks have
the same degree distribution, their topology is quite dif-
ferent. The percolation thresholds qc for both networks
are close, but the onion-like network is definitely more
robust. It is obvious that onion-like and assortativity are
distinct properties and that our new robustness measure
is significantly more adequate compared to the classical
measure qc.
E. High betweenness attack: Instead of removing the
most connected nodes from a network, other attack
strategies can also be used. For example, one of the
most harmful strategies is the so-called high-betweenness
based adaptive attack[14]. In this case the nodes are
removed according to their betweenness in the network
after removing each node. In Supporting Figure 4a
and 4b the robustness against this type of attack is
shown for scale-free and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks. Note
that although the networks are optimized against high
degree-based attack, the designed networks become also
significantly more resilient to high-betweenness adaptive
attack.
F. Properties of onion-like networks: In Supporting
Figs. 5a and 5b we show the average shortest path length
and the diameter of onion-like networks obtained from
scale-free and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network models. While both
properties remain similar for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and the im-
proved network, both properties increase for onion-like
networks starting from scale-free networks. Neverthe-
less, the diameter and the average shortest path length
increase not faster than logarithmic with system size for
onion-like networks.
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Supporting Figure 1. a) The size of the largest connected cluster s(q) versus the fraction of removed nodes for scale-free
model networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks and random regular networks with 〈k〉 = 4 after applying our algorithm. b) The degree
distribution p(k) versus the degree k of these networks after applying our algorithm.
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Supporting Figure 2. In (a) we show the fraction of sites belonging to the largest connected cluster s(q) versus the number
of attacked nodes q before and after applying our algorithm on scale-free networks with N = 4000 and γ = 2.5. The same is
shown in (c) for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 4000 and M = 8000. The cumulative conductance distributions F (G) versus
the conductance G for scale-free and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks are shown in (b) and (d), respectively, before and after the changes.
Conductances between two nodes are measured between all pairs of nodes, assuming that each link in the network has unitary
conductance.
9Supporting Figure 3. The size of the largest connected cluster s(q) versus the fraction of removed nodes for a highly assortative
network(dashed line) and its improved onion-like counterpart(straight line). The figure also show the different structures of
both networks.
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Supporting Figure 4. The fraction of sites that belong to the largest connected cluster s(q) vs the fraction of attacked nodes q
before and after applying our algorithm using the high betweenness adaptive attack for (a) scale-free networks with N = 4000
and γ = 2.5 and (b) for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 4000 and M = 8000. The high betweenness adaptive attack is the
most effective malicious attack, but it requires global network information.
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